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Nancy Amoury Combs

Prosecuting perpetrators of mass atrocities in international tribunals gives rise to unique evidentiary challenges. The crimes prosecuted in these tribunals feature large-scale violence that
frequently takes place over protracted periods of time in locations far from the courtrooms in
which the crimes are ultimately prosecuted. Credible evidence can be hard to come by because
recalcitrant states erect obstacles that impede prosecutors or defense counsel seeking to investigate
the crimes, because witnesses fear retaliation for their testimony, and because considerable time
typically elapses between the crimes and the trials. Given the unique nature of international
criminal trials and the unique challenges they pose, it ·s hould come as no surprise that a unique
system has developed to govern the treatment of evidence at the international tribunals. Although
many discussions of international criminal evidence focus primarily on admissibility and consequently observe that the evidentiary schemes of international criminal tribunals follow the civil
law model, evidentiary issues at the international tribunals cover far broader ground and include
both civil law · and common law features. Space constraints prevent me from presenting a thorough discussion of international criminal evidence as a whole, but I will endeavor here to touch
upon the most prominent evidentiary issues that arise during the pre-trial, trial and post-trial
phases of international criminal proceedings.

Pre-trial evidentiary issues
The primary evidentiary issues that arise during a case's pre-trial phase concern the collection of
evidence and the disclosure of evidence. As for the former, international criminal tribunalslike conunon law domestic courts-bestow on each party the obligation to identifY witnesses
and collect the evidence that the parties will later present at trial. Some commentators have
noted the structural advantages that the prosecution enjoy over the defense in the collection of
evidence. These advantages stem primarily from the fact that the prosecution is one of the main
organs of each of the international criminal tribunals; consequently, the Tribunals' statutes
bestow on the prosecution distinct powers to collect evidence, and members of the office of the
prosecutor enjoy privileges and immunities that facilitate their on-site investigations.' In certain
tribunals, defense counsel are also at a comparative disadvantage when it comes to their ability
to gain access to crime sites and locate witnesses. The International Criminal Tribunal for
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Rwanda (ICTR) defense counsel, for instance, have at various times accused the government of
Rwanda of impeding investigations by harassing and intimidating defense witnesses to prevent
them from testitying 2 [n other cases, defense counsel have lacked sufficient funds to carry out
adequate investigations. 3 Although the Trial Chambers cannot remedy insufficient funding, they
have acknowledged the difficulties that have sometimes confronted parties seeking access to
evidence and they have committed themselves to providing 'every practicable facility' that they
can provide ' when faced with a request by a party for assistance in presenting its case."
International criminal tribunals require the disclosure of much of the evidence that will
eventually be presented at trial. As a comparative matter, the International Criminal Tribunal
for the former Yugoslavaia ([CTY) and [CTR rules on pre-trial disclosure steer a rniddle course
between the broad and narrow disclosure frameworks prevailing in civil law and common law
jurisdictions, respectively. [n the United States, for instance, the parties are required to disclose
little or no information to the judge or jury prior to triaP because the judge or jury has little or
no reason to possess that information prior to trial. The same is not true in civil law jurisdictions,
where judges take primary control over the questioning. For such judicial questioning to be
effective, judges must have substantial knowledge about the case. To that end, investigating
authorities in civil law countries record all the documents pertaining to the pre-trial investigation in a dossier6 and make that dossier available to the presiding judge/ among others."
Although ICTY and ICTR prosecutors are not obliged to create a dossier containing all of the
documents relevant to the case, they are obliged to disclose a substantial quantity of supporting
information. For instance, the [CTY, [CTR and Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) prosecutors must disclose, among other things, a witness list which summarizes each witness's testimony;
an exhibits list;9 all material which accompanied the indictment when confirmation was sought;
and copies of all statements of witnesses that the prosecution intends to call at trial. 10 The defense
has similar disclosure obligations and consequently must provide the prosecution with a witness
list, a summary of witness testimony, and an exhibits list. II Additionally, the defense must notity
the prosecution if it intends to raise certain defenses, such as alibi or lack of mental responsibility,
and it must provide certain information regarding the defenses. 12 International Crirninal Court
([CC) parties have similar, though slightly more complex, disclosure requirements because some
disclosure obligations come into play before the confirmation hearing, wIllie others arise later,
before trial. 13 Although the disclosure of the above information is typically expected to take place
prior to trial, concerns about witness safety have recently led th e ICTR, SCSL and th e ICC to
permit 'rolling disclosure; in which witnesses' identities are disclosed after the trial has comm enced but well before the witnesses' actual testimony. 14
Tribunal prosecutors are also obliged to disclose exculpatory material, typi cally defined as
'material which in the actual knowledge of the Prosecutor may suggest the innocence or mitigate th e guilt of the accused or affect the credibility of Prosecution evidence.'1 5 Moreover, ICC
prosecutors are obligated not only to disclose exculpatory evidence but also to search for it. 16
The defense may also request exculpatory materials from prosecutors, but before such a request
will be granted, the defense must make a prima facie showing that the materials are apt to be
relevant and exculpatory and that they are in the custody of the Prosecution. 17The responsibility
of determining whether material is exculpatory rests in the first instance with the prosecution,1 8
and the prosecution must exercise this responsibility in good faith. 19 [t is this good-faith
obligation that is so frequently in question at the Tribunals because, although the legal standards
governing the disclosure of exculpatory evidence are relatively clear-cut, defense counsel
frequently claim prosecutorial violations of the standard. 20 As a consequence, commentators have
suggested that Tribunal judges take a more active role in monitoring disclosure and that they
apply heavy penalties when disclosure obligations are violated. 21
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Evidentiary issues arising during trial
Most evidentiary issues occur during trial. This section will consequently discuss (1) the way in
which evidence is presented to the Tribunals; (2) the admissibility standards governing evidence
in international criminal trials; and (3) the exclusionary rules that prevent evidence from being
considered.

How is evidence presented in international criminal proceedings?
The presentation of evidence at the ICTY, ICTR and SCSL follows an adversarial model. That
is, international criminal trials in those bodies feature two cases-a prosecution case and a
defense case-and each party presents its own evidence at trial . Rule 85 of both the ICTY and
ICTR Rules of Procedure and Evidence (RPE) reflects this model and provides that evidence
will be presented in the following sequence: evidence for the prosecution, evidence for the
defense, prosecution evidence in rebuttal, defense evidence in rejoinder, evidence ordered by
the Trial Chamber and finally any relevant information to assist the Trial Chambers in sentencing.22 Furthermore, each party must be permitted to examine and re-examine the witnesses they
call and to cross-examine the opposing party's witnesses. Judges, however, are permitted to ask
questions of witnesses at any time, 23 and the Chambers also have the discretion to vary the order
of the presentation of evidence if it is in the interests of justice to do so. In Rukundo, for instance,
an ICTR Trial Chamber called as its own witness a witness who had originally testified for the
Prosecution but who had subsequently recanted his testimony. Rule 85 typically requires Trial
Chambers that wish to call witnesses to do so after the close of both the prosecution and defense
cases. However, in light of its interest in determining the validity of these accusations as well as
the seriousness of retracting sworn testimony, the Trial Chamber decided to depart from the
normal sequence of evidence presentation in order to recall the witness during the Prosecution's
case. 24
Sequencing issues also arise when Trial Chambers receive motions to present rebuttal evidence or to reopen a case. As a general rule, the prosecution must present evidence pertaining to
the defendant's guilt as part of its case in chief.25 Rule 85 does anticipate that the prosecution may
seek to present evidence in rebuttal, as just noted, but such evidence must be 'limited to matters
that arise directly and specifically out of defense evidence.'26 Consequently, Trial Chambers have
proven reluctant to permit evidence in rebuttal where that evidence is probative of the accused's
guilt or is designed to fill some gap that was reasonably foreseeable to the prosecution. 27 If the
evidence sought to be presented does not meet the standards for rebuttal evidence, then a party
may seek to reopen its case,28 but such a request is not apt to be granted unless the evidence
sought to be presented is 'fresh evidence.' Fresh evidence has been defined not merely as 'evidence that was not in fact in the possession of the prosecution at the time of the conclusion of
its case, but as evidence by which the exercise of all reasonable diligence could not have been
obtained by the prosecution at that time.'29 If a Trial Chamber does conclude that the evidence
sought to be presented is 'fresh,' it must consider a number of additional factors in determining
whether to exercise its discretion to reopen the case. These include the stage of the trial at which
the evidence is sought to be adduced, the delay likely to be caused by reopening the case,30 and
the effect of presenting new evidence against one accused in a multi-accused case. 3\
The ICC employs a more flexible approach than the ad hoc Tribunals when it comes to the
sequencing of evidence presentation at trial. In particular, Article 64(8)(b) of the Rome Statute
gives the Presiding Judge of the Trial Chamber complete discretion over the procedural model to
be followed at trial ]2 That is, the judge may follow the ICTY and ICTR and adopt an adversarial
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model of evidence presentatio n, as just described, but th e judge also has the discretion to
adopt a civil law mode of evidence presentation in which th e judge takes th e primary role in
questio nin g witnesses. 33 Thus far, th e emerging prac tice of th e ICC is veerin g toward an
adversarial evidence presentation at trial. In the ICC's first trial, for instance, the Trial C hamber
issued instructions that permitted th e party calling th e witn ess to ask the first questions of th e
witn ess, with this questioning followed by questi oning fro m th e party not caJling the witn ess]4

What evidence is admissible?
Ge ne ral admissibility rules
The international tribunals have adopted lenient and fl exible admissibility rules. Pursuant to
Rule 89(C), an IC TY Trial C hamber ' may admit any relevant evidence w hich it deems to have
probative value.' The other ad hoc Tribunals and the ICC follow a similarly flexible approac h.35
The R ome Statute authorizes IC C Trial Chambers to ' rule on the relevance or adm.issibility
of any evidence, tak.ing into account, inter alia, the probative value of the evidence and any prejudice that such evidence may cause to a fair trial o r to a fair evaluation of th e testimony of a
witness.'36 The ICC's Rules of E vidence and Procedure maintain this flexibility by authori zing
the Trial C hambers to 'assess freely all evidence submitted in order to determine its relevance or
admissibility.' 37
Although the admissibility standard in use at the internatio nal tribunals requires that evidence
be both relevant and probative, the threshold for relevance and probity is rather low. As
the Musema Trial C hamber put it, th e standard of admissibility embodied in Rule 89(C) requires
the evidence merely to have 'some relevance and some proba ti ve valu e.'38 As I will discuss below,
hearsay evidence is admissible at th e internatio nal tribunals, and , as a ge neral matter, the Trial
C hambers have exhibited 'a fairly unifo rm tendency ... towards admitting evidence in th e fi rst
place leaving its weight to be assessed when all the evidence is being considered by the Tr ial
C hamber in reaching its j udgement.'39 H owever, o ne controversial question has pertained to the
role of reliability in the admissibility decision. For instance, some Trial and Appeals C hambers
have concluded that the reliability of a piece of evidence is relevant to its admissibil.ity. Under
this approach, then, evidence that is lack.ing in rel.iability sho uld be excluded as with out probati ve
value under Rule 89(C)40The alternati ve approach is to ad mit th e evidence bu t to consider its
rel.iability when deter mi ning its weight 41 T his approach has been endo rsed by several co mme nta tors, w ho point out that it is 'consistent with th e free system of evidence that th e Tribun al has
adopted.'42As fo r the ICC, a proposal was introdu ced during o ne of th e P reparato ry Commissions
to include reliability as a fac tor to be free ly assessed by a C hamber in determining releva nce or
admissibility. H owever, beca use no consensus was reac hed on this qu esti on, the ICC evidentiary
rules do not address it 43

The ad missi bility of specific categories of evide nce
Because an internatio nal criminal defendant has the ri ght to 'examin e, or have exami ned, the
wi tnesses against him and to obtain th e attendance and examinatio n of w itn esses on his behal f,'4 4
th e international tribunals ge nerally favo r oral testimony. Rule 90(A) of th e ICTY 's and the
ICTR 's initial Rules of Procedure provided that 'witnesses shall, in prin cipl e, be heard di rectl y
by the C hambers.' The R o me Statute also expresses a preference for Live evidence th ro ugh
Arti cle 69(2), which states that ' th e testimony of a witn ess at trial shall be given in person.'
Oral presentation of evidence has been seen as providing the best opportuni ty for a party to
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challenge the evidence of an opposing party and for the Trial Chambers to evaluate the credibility of the presented evidence. 45 These benefits notwithstanding, exceptions to the principle
of orality have always existed, and in recent years some tribunals have chosen to temper their
preference for orality as a means of expediting trials.
The Tribunals' above-mentioned willingness to admit hearsay evidence constitutes one longstanding exception to the principle of orality. A hearsay statement is defined as a 'statement, other
than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove
the truth of the matter asserted.'46 Although the admission of hearsay statements contravenes both
the principle of orality and the right to confront witnesses upon which that principle is based,
international tribunals have refused to exclude hearsay statements categorically. Early ICTY
decisions held that there existed ' no blanket prohibition on the admission of hearsay evidence,' but
that its admission depended on its relevance, probative value, and reliabilityY Trial Chambers thus
have considerable discretion in determining the admissibility of specific hearsay statements; as
mentioned above, some Trial Chambers consider the reliability of the hearsay statement in
determining its admissibility while other Trial Chambers are inclined to admit all hearsay
statements but to consider their reliability when determining the weight to afford them. 48
Other exceptions to the principle of orality are of more recent vintage and stem from the
Tribunals' understandable desire to expedite trial proceedings. As noted above, the original version of the ICTY's Rule 90(A) expressed the Tribunal's preference for oral testimony. However,
later amendments to the ICTY rules eliminated that preference 49 and created mechanisms to
introduce written evidence in lieu of oral witness testimony. For instance, although all of the
Tribunals provide for the admission of depositions, the ICTY amended its rule to lower the
burden on those seeking to introduce deposition testimony.50 The admission of deposition testimony does not compromise the confrontation rights of the accused in the same way that the
admission of witness statements does because, during a deposition, the defense has the opportunity to cross-examine the witness. No such cross-examination is envisaged for written statements that are tendered in lieu of oral testimony, but Rule 92bis nonetheless permits ICTY,
ICTR and SCSL Trial Chambers to admit such statements so long as they go to proof of a
matter other than the acts and conduct of the accused as charged in the indictment. The version
of Rule 92bis in effect at the ICTY and ICTR delineates a series offactors that Trial Chambers
should consider in determining whether to admit the statements,51 and it requires that certain
formalities be observed in order to enhance the reliability of the statements. 52 Because Rule
92bis does not permit the introduction of written statements to prove the acts and conduct of
the accused, the rule has been useful primarily for expediting the presentation of'crirne-base'
evidence. 53 Moreover, some commentators have noted that because rule 92bis does not permit
the introduction of written statements to prove the acts and conduct of the accused, the rule is
a 'mandatory exclusionary rule' that constitutes 'a significant departure from the initial flexible
nature of the ICTY's law of evidence.'54
The ICC takes a more restrictive approach to the admission of documentary evidence.
Pursuant to Rule 68 of the ICC's RPE, documentary evidence of a witness may be admitted
only when both parties have had the opportunity to question the witness during the taking of
testimony or the witness is available to be cross-examined at trial.
What evidence is excluded?
Although the international tribunals do utilize liberal admissibility standards, they are nonetheless permitted, and in some cases required, to exclude certain evidence. ICTY Trial Chambers,
for instance, are authorized under Rule 89(D) to exclude evidence if its probative value is
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substantially outweighed by the need to ensure a fair trial. T he Rome Statute instructs ICC
Trial Chambers similarly, not with a specific exclusionary rule, but by inserting fair trial considerations into the Trial Chamber's decision on admissibility. Thus, Article 69(4) of the Rome
Statute requires Trial Chambers that are considering the admissibility of a piece of evidence to
take account of ' the probative value of the evidence and any prejudice that such evidence may
cause to a fair trial or to a fair evaluation of the testimony of a witness.' The ICTR does not
have a similar rule, and this omission arguably has affected the Trial Chambers' recourse to the
most prominent mandatory exclusion that is included in the rules of all of the Tribunals.
That mandatory exclusion, included at Rule 95 of the ICTY's and ICTR's RPE , requires
Trial Chambers to exclude evidence if 'its admission is antithetical to, and would seriously
damage, the integrity of the proceedings' or if it has been 'obtained by methods which cast substantial doubt' on the reliability of the evidence.55 ICTYTrial Chambers have made little use of
this provision, preferring instead to exclude evidence pursuant to Rule 89(D) , discussed above. 56
By contrast, ICTR Trial Chambers, having no Rule 89(D) at their disposal, have made greater
use of the mandatory exclusion appearing in Rule 95. Of course, even at the ICTR, 'Rule 95
does not require automatic exclusion of all unlawfully obtained evidence.'57 As a
consequence, ICTR Trial Chambers have refused to exclude witness testimony when the contemporaneous notes of the witness's interview were not preserved;58 they have refused to exclude
a statement taken one week after the accused's arrest, when he had not yet been taken before a
judge,59 and they have refused to exclude a document seized during an illegal arrest, unless there
is a specific showing that the document was not reliable or that the admission of the document
would seriously damage the integrity of the proceedings. 60 By contrast, evidence will be excluded
if the integrity of the proceedings would otherwise be seriously damaged. 61 Consequently, ICTR
Trial Chambers will exclude statements taken in violation of the defendant's right to the assistance of counsel,62 statements taken without informing the accused of the charges against him ,63
and statements taken in violation of a witness protection order.64
The analogous ICC rule appears to require that a higher standard be met before evidence will
be excluded. In particular, to exclude evidence under Rome Statute Article 69(7), the Trial
Chamber must find that the evidence was both 'obtained by means of a violation of this Statute
or internationally recognized human rights' and that 'the violation casts substantial doubt on th e
reliability of the evidence' or that the 'admission of the evidence would be antithetica.l to and
would seriously damage the integrity of the proceedings.' Zahar and Sluiter find fault with this
formulation, asking rhetorically: 'Does admission of evidence obtained in violation of human
rights not by definition damage the integrity of the proceedings?'65 These conunentators go on
to opine that an 'interpretation of Article 69(7) , according to which not every human rights
violation damages the integrity of the proceedings, amounts to a departure from the origin al
purpose of Rule 95 of the rCTY and ICTR RPE, and also makes a mockery of human ri ghts
law as an indivisible set of minimum legal standards.'66

Post-trial evidentiary issues - weighing evidence
As noted, international tribunals boast liberal admissibility rules that result in the admission of a
great deal of evidence, much of which would be excluded in common law criminal trials.
However, the fact that Trial Chambers admit a great deal of evidence does not tell us anything
about how they weigh the evidence that they admit. The ICTR Appeals Chamber warned that
it is 'neither possible nor proper to draw up an exhaustive list of criteria for the assessment of
evidence, given the specific circumstances of each case and the duty of the judge to rule on each
case in an impartial and independent manner,'67 but general principles regarding the weight
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accorded to certain classes of evidence can be discerned. 68 It goes almost without saying that
hearsay evidence is afforded less weight than the testimony of a witness who has given that testimony under oath and has been cross-examined. 69 Moreover, in keeping with their adherence
to the principle of orality, Trial C hambers have also held live testimony to be weightier than
video link testimony.70 Live testimony not only better respects the accused's right to confrontation but also it affords the Trial Chamber the best opportunity to evaluate the demeanor and
credibility of the witness . Video link testimony, however, has been held to be weightier than
testimony given by deposition. 71 In determining what weight is appropriate for documentary
evidence, Trial Chambers consider its authenticity as well as its source or authorship. In particular, in determining the authenticity of a document, a Trial Chamber will consider its form, contents and the purported use of the document, among other factors. 72

Conclusion
International criminal evidence rules constitute a unique amalgam.The Tribunals' basic approach
to evidence derives from civil law systems, but that civil law approach must be utilized in trial
proceedings that are primarily common law in character. Not surprisingly, this blending creates
certain tensions, as do recent efforts to speed up trial proceedings, which can be seen as compromising certain fair trial rights. Indeed, safeguarding the accused's right to an expeditious trial
while simultaneously protecting his or her other fair trial rights stands as one of international
criminal law's most pressing challenges .
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